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DENIAL LOGIC
†FLORIAN LENGYEL AND ‡BENOIT ST-PIERRE
Abstract. Denial Logic is the logic of an agent whose justified beliefs
are false, who cannot avow his own propositional attitudes or believe tau-
tologies, but who can believe contradictions. Denial Logic DL is defined
as justification logic JL together with the Denial axiom t : E → ¬E and
the Evidence Pairing axiom s : D ∧ t : E → [s& t] : D ∧E. Using Arte-
mov’s natural JL semantics, in which justifications are interpreted as
sets of formulas, we provide an inductive construction of models of DL,
and show that DL is sound and complete. Some notions developed for
JL, such as constant specifications and internalization, are inconsistent
with DL. In contrast, we define negative constant specifications, which
can be used to model agents in DL with justified false beliefs. Denial
logic can therefore be relevant to philosophical skepticism. We define
coherent negative constant specifications for DL to model a Putnamian
brain in a vat with the justified false belief that it is not a brain in a
vat, and prove a “Blue Pill” theorem, which produces a model of JL in
which “I am a brain in a vat” is false. We extend DL to the multi-modal
logic DL ⊕JL LP to model envatted brains who can justify and check
tautologies and avow their own propositional attitudes. Denial Logic
was inspired by online debates over anthropogenic global warming.
Keywords justification logic; logic of proofs; modal and epistemic logic;
skepticism.
Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the study of logics of skepticism. Our
setting is Justification Logic JL, the minimal logic for a family of logics that
includes the Logic of Proofs LP, a Hilbert-style logical system extending
classical and intuitionistic propositional logic, with additional propositional
types of the form (t : A), read as “term t is justification for A” [3, 5]. LP
and the related broader class of justification logics are, in a precise sense,
refinements of modal logics, including K, K4, K45, KD45, T, S4 and S5 [3,
4, 5, 6, 7]. Semantics for these systems include Kripke–Fitting models, Mkr-
tychev models, and arithmetical provability semantics [20, 30, 3]. Recently,
Artemov provided Justification Logic with a natural semantics in which justi-
fications are interpreted as sets of formulas [7]. In addition to its applications
in epistemic logic, modal logic and proof theory, LP has been generalized to
interactive multi-agent computation [25].
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Studies of justification logics have tended to focus on justified true be-
lief, provability and logical omniscience [19, 3, 2]. Some notions defined
for justification logics, such as axiomatically appropriate constant specifi-
cations, factivity and logical introspection, reflect this focus [1, 6, 4]. Here
we study a logic of justified false belief, Denial Logic DL, defined as JL to-
gether with the Denial axiom t : E → ¬E and the Evidence Pairing axiom
s : D ∧ t : E → [s& t] : D ∧E. DL is the logic of an agent whose justified
beliefs are false, who cannot avow his own propositional attitudes or believe
tautologies, but who can believe contradictions.
This paper is organized as follows. The first section defines the syntax
of Denial Logic and shows that DL cannot justify any of its axioms. We
observe that notion of constant specification for JL can lead to inconsistency
in DL. Accordingly, we define the notion of negative constant specification.
The second section extends Artemov’s natural semantics for JL to DL. We
define the notion of model for DL, prove completeness, and give an inductive
construction of models of DL. We apply the inductive construction of models
of DL to produce models satisfying negative constant specifications and to
prove that the Evidence Pairing axiom is independent of the other axioms
of DL.
The third section applies DL to Putnam’s brains in vats where we prove
a “Blue Pill” theorem [8]. Here we use justification logic to define a formal
notion of coherence suggested by philosophical coherence theories of truth
[17].
In the fourth section, we note that a DL agent cannot believe tautologies
of propositional logic or avow any of his propositional attitudes. To handle
agents that can, we extend DL to DL ⊕JL LP, the algebraic fibring of DL
with the Logic of Proofs LP constrained by justification logic JL.
In the fifth section we apply DL⊕JLLP to an agent who denies that climate
models indicate anything true, but who allows that CO2 is a greenhouse gas.
The Denial axiom of the DL fragment of DL ⊕JL LP is used to model the
agent’s assertion that every indicator produced by a climate model is wrong.
This agent cannot provably justify any any scientific conclusion that might
follow from the concession that CO2 is a greenhouse gas.
In the last section we observe that the Blue Pill theorem extends to DL⊕JL
LP.
0.1. Related work. Epistemic logics have been used and developed for the
analysis of philosophical skepticism. Steiner treats Cartesian skepticism in
a normal modal logic and shows that a strong skeptical argument remains if
the KK axiom is dropped [41]. Schotch and Jennings propose an alternative
to possible-world semantics and define Basic Epistemic Logic, a non-normal
modal logic developed to address problems of logical omniscience and skepti-
cism [37]. Schotch defines the proto-epistemic logics, in which the knowledge
modality need not distribute over implication [38]. The application here of
justification logic to philosophical skepticism appears to be new.
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1. Denial Logic
The language of DL is the same as that of justification logic JL, with the
addition of a binary operation & on justification terms [6]. Symbols of DL
include those occurring in justification terms as follows.
justification constants c, c1, c2, . . .
justification variables u, v, w, x, y, z, x1 , x2, . . .
binary operations ·, +, &
punctuation [, ]
The set of justification constants, which may be finite or infinite, is specified
through what we will call a negative constant specification (see subsection
1.1).
A justification term t is an expression of the form
t ::= ci |xj | [t+ t] | [t · t] | [t& t]
where ci is a justification constant and xj is a justification variable.
Symbols occurring in formulas include justification terms and the follow-
ing.
propositional variables A,B,C, . . . ,X, Y, Z,A1, A2, . . .
propositional constant ⊥
unary connective ¬
binary connectives ∧,∨,→
punctuation (,),:
A formula A of a DL is an expression of the form
A ::= ⊥ |Ai | (A ∧A) | (A ∨A) | (A→ A) | t : A
where t is a justification term and where Ai is a propositional variable. It
should be noted that in the formula t : P , the justification term t justifies
specific propositional syntax: t : P may hold but t : P ∧ P may fail in some
model of JL.
The axioms of DL include axioms of classical logic, the Application and
Sum axioms of JL, the Denial axiom and the Evidence Pairing axiom:
(1.1) Application. s : (P → Q)→ (t : P → [s · t] : Q)
(1.2) Sum. s : P → [s+ t] : P, t : P → [s+ t] : P
(1.3) Denial. t : P → ¬P
(1.4) Evidence Pairing. (s : P ∧ t : Q)→ [s & t] : (P ∧Q)
in which s and t are justification terms. The Evidence Pairing Axiom is
redundant in justification logics with axiomatically complete constant spec-
ifications but not in DL (cf. Theorem 18 and the remarks following for
definitions).
The rule of inference of DL is modus ponens MP. We write ⊢ P if P is
provable in DL from the axioms and MP.
Denial Logic cannot justify its own Denial Axiom.
Proposition 1. DL + {s : (t : P → ¬P )} is inconsistent.
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Proof. Suppose that for some justification term s, ⊢ s : (t : P → ¬P ). From
the Denial Axiom, ⊢ s : (t : P → ¬P )→ ¬ (t : P → ¬P ) . ByMP, ⊢ ¬ (t : P → ¬P ).

1.1. Negative constant specifications. A constant specification CS for a
justification logic L is a set of formulas en : · · · : e1 : A in which e1, . . . , e1 are
justification constants and A is an axiom of L, and which is downward closed:
if en : · · · : e1 : A is in CS, then so is en−1 : · · · : e1 : A [6]. In particular, if
e : A is in CS, then so is A. An argument similar to that of Proposition 1
shows that nonempty constant specifications for DL are inconsistent unless
they contain no formula of the form e : P .
However, DL can have what we call negative constant specifications. A
negative constant specification NCS for DL is a collection C of formulas of
the form e1 : · · · : en : P or the negation of such a formula, where the ei are
justification constants, such that DL + NCS is consistent and where C is
closed under the following rules.
Rule 1. If e : P ∈ C, then ¬P ∈ C.
Rule 2. If ¬e : P ∈ C, then P ∈ C.
Rule 1 is motivated by the Denial axiom and Rule 2 is consistent with
it. If DL + {¬R} is consistent, then {e1 : R, ¬R} is a negative constant
specification.
The choice of a language L for DL together with a negative constant
specification (which may be empty) determines we call a denial logic.
2. Natural semantics of DL
We recall Artemov’s natural semantics for JL [7]. Let L be a justification
logic. Let 2 = {0, 1} denote the set of truth values, let Var denote the set
of propositional variables of L, let Tm denote the set of justification terms
of L, and let Fm denote the set of L-formulas. For X,Y ⊆ Fm we define
the set X · Y (of consequents of implications in X and antecedents in Y ) by
X · Y = {Q| (P → Q) ∈ X ∧ P ∈ Y }.
Also, we define
X & Y = {P ∧Q|P ∈ X ∧Q ∈ Y }.
Following Artemov, a modular model of JL is a pair of maps, both denoted
by ∗, of types Var → 2 and Tm → 2Fm respectively, which satisfy the
following relationsn [7].
s∗ · t∗ ⊆ [s · t]∗(1)
s∗ ∪ t∗ ⊆ [s+ t]∗(2)
We define (t : P )∗ = 1 iff P ∈ t∗. The model ∗ is extended homomorphically
to Boolean connectives in the obvious way. We write  P for P ∗ = 1.
The relation (1) corresponds to the Application axiom (1.1) and the rela-
tion (2) corresponds to the Sum Axiom (1.2) of JL [7].
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Proposition 2. Let ∗ be a modular model of JL and let L be a denial logic.
The Evidence Pairing axiom of L is satisfied by ∗ if the relation (3) holds.
s∗ & t∗ ⊆ [s& t]∗(3)
Proof. Suppose that ∗ is a modular model. If  s : P and  t : Q hold, then
P ∈ s∗ and Q ∈ t∗, which implies that P∧Q ∈ s∗&t∗. By (3), P∧Q ∈ [s&t]∗,
so that  [s& t] : P ∧Q. It follows that  s : P ∧ t : Q → [s& t] : P ∧Q
holds if (3) holds. 
The image t∗ of a justification term is a set of formulas called a justifica-
tion set. Models of DL satisfy an additional property: justification sets of
modular models of DL contain only false formulas.
Proposition 3. Let ∗ be a modular model of DL. For every justification
term t,
(4) t∗ ⊆ ∗−1(0).
Proof.  t : P → ¬P iff t : P ∗ = 0 or P ∗ = 0 iff P /∈ t∗ or P ∗ = 0 iff
t∗ ⊆ ∗−1(0). 
A modular model of DL is a modular model ∗ of JL that satisfies (3) and
(4). Given a negative constant specification NCS DL, a model ∗ respects
NCS if all formulas of the NCS hold in ∗. This is a translation to DL of
the analogous notion for constant specifications defined in [6, 7].
Example 4. There are obvious models of DL: any map ∗ : Var → 2 can
be extended to Tm → 2Fm by setting t∗ = ∅ for any justification term t;
from there ∗ is extended to Fm in the obvious way. We call such a modular
model a trivial model. The Denial axiom is satisfied in all trivial models.
2.1. Soundness and completeness of DL.
Theorem 5. DL+NCS ⊢ ϕ if and only if  ϕ holds in every model of DL
respecting NCS.
Proof. The soundness DL follows from Proposition 3 and Theorem 1 of [7].
The proof of completeness is the same as in [7]. 
2.2. Inductive construction of models. We give an inductive construc-
tion of all modular models of DL, depending on a valuation of propositional
variables and a Boolean valued-functional.
This construction of a nontrivial modular model for DL will extend a
map ∗ : Var → 2 simultaneously to Tm → 2Fm and to ∗ : Fm → 2.
These models will be parametrized by a Boolean-valued functional of type
F : 2Var × τ3 → 2, where the ordinal τ will be defined.
Since Tm is inductively defined, there exist well orderings on Tm so
that if γ0, . . . , γn are ordinals, tγi ∈ Tm and tγn = F (tγ0 , . . . , tγn−1) then
γ0, . . . , γn−1 < γn. Fix such a well ordering on Tm. Likewise, Fm is
constructed inductively from Var and Tm, so a well ordering can be de-
fined on Fm so that for ordinals γ0, . . . , γn−1, β0, . . . βm, if Pβj ∈ Fm and
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Pβm = G(tγ0 , . . . , tγn−1 ;Pβ0 , . . . , Pβm−1), then for 0 ≤ i < n and 0 ≤ j < m,
max(γi, βj) < βm. There may exist ordinals β for which Pβ is undefined; we
assume that a given case below holds only when relations occurring in them
are defined and hold–this applies to the tγ ∈ Tm as well.
The well ordering of Fm implies that Fm =
⋃
α<τ Fmα, where Fmα =
{Pβ : β < α}, and where τ is the order type of the chosen well ordering
of Fm. For γ < α < τ and tγ ∈ Tm, we will inductively define the set
t∗γ,α ⊆ Fmα and the satisfaction relation ∗α : Fmα → 2.
At the end of the construction we set t∗γ = ∪α<τ t
∗
γ,α and likewise extend
the ∗α to Fm. We proceed by induction on α < τ .
Suppose α = 0. Set all t∗γ,0 = ∅ and let ∗0 be the empty function Fm0 → 2.
Suppose α > 0. The inductive hypothesis is that ∗σ is defined on Fmσ for
σ < α and that t∗γ,σ is defined for γ, σ < α.
If α is a limit ordinal, then set t∗γ = ∪β<αt
∗
γ,β and let ∗α be the union
of the ∗β for β < α. Otherwise, α is a successor ordinal and the remaining
cases apply. For Boolean connectives we show → only as this is needed to
verify the Application axiom; the cases of conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨ and
negation ¬ follow the same pattern and are not shown.
Let β, γ < α.
Case 1. Pβ is in Var.
1a) Define
t∗,βγ,α =
{
{Pβ}, if P
∗
β = 0 ∧ F (∗, α, β, γ) = 1;
∅, otherwise.
1b) Set Pβ
∗α = Pβ
∗.
Case 2. Pβ = Pµ → Pν for µ, ν < α. The well ordering on Fm ensures that
µ, ν < β < α. By the inductive hypothesis, the partial satisfaction relation
∗β is defined on Fmmax(µ,ν) and hence on Pµ and Pν .
2a) Define
t∗,βγ,α =
{
{Pβ}, if P
∗β
µ = 1 ∧ P
∗β
ν = 0 ∧ F (∗, α, β, γ) = 1;
∅, otherwise.
2b) Define
P ∗αβ =
{
0, if P
∗β
µ = 1 ∧ P
∗β
ν = 0;
1, otherwise.
Case 3. Pβ = tγ : Pδ for γ, δ < α. Again, γ, δ < β < α and by the inductive
hypothesis, P
∗β
δ is defined.
3a) Define
t∗,βγ,α =
{
{Pδ}, if P
∗β
δ = 0 ∧ F (∗, α, β, γ) = 1;
∅, otherwise.
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3b) Define
P ∗αβ =
{
1, if P
∗β
δ = 0 ∧ F (∗, α, β, γ) = 1;
0, otherwise.
Case 4. None of the above (Pβ is undefined). Do nothing.
Prologue. At the end of stage α, we define for γ < α,
t∗γ,α =
⋃
β<α
t∗,βγ.α ∪
⋃
σ<α
t∗γ,σ
Before proceeding to stage α + 1, we may need to update the justification
set t∗γ,α to ensure that the Sum axiom (1.2) and the Evidence Pairing axiom
(1.4) continue to hold. For each γ < α there are three cases.
Case a) There exist µ, ν < γ such that tγ = tµ + tν . If t
∗
µ,α ∪ t
∗
ν,α ⊆ t
∗
γ,α
do nothing; otherwise redefine
t∗γ,α := t
∗
µ,α ∪ t
∗
ν,α ∪
⋃
β<α
t∗,βγ.α ∪
⋃
σ<α
t∗γ,σ.
Case b) There exist µ, ν < γ such that tγ = tµ & tν . If t
∗
µ,α & t
∗
ν,α ⊆ t
∗
γ,α
do nothing; otherwise redefine
t∗γ,α :=
(
t∗µ,α & t
∗
ν,α
)
∪
⋃
β<α
t∗,βγ.α ∪
⋃
σ<α
t∗γ,σ.
Case c) None of the above. This includes the possibility that tγ is unde-
fined. Do nothing.
(End of construction 2.2).
Proposition 6. For each Boolean-valued functional F : 2Var × τ3 → 2 and
for each valuation ∗ : Var → 2, the construction 2.2 yields a modular model
of DL.
Proof. We show that conditions (1), (2) and (3) are satisfied. Note that at
each stage α only formulas that evaluate to 0 (false) are enumerated into the
image of any justification term. Hence (3) is satisfied, and by Proposition
(3), the Denial axiom (1.3) holds.
For (1), note that for any s, t ∈ Tm, s∗ · t∗ = ∅. Otherwise there exist
P,Q ∈ Fm such that Q ∈ s∗ · t∗, P → Q ∈ s∗ and P ∈ t∗. But then
(P → Q)∗ = 0, which forces P ∗ = 1 and Q∗ = 0. But since P ∈ t∗, by
construction, P ∗ = 0. This is a contradiction. Therefore (1) holds vacuously,
and the Application axiom (1.1) holds.
The Prologue at stage α of Construction (2.2) ensures that the Sum Axiom
(1.2) and the Evidence Pairing Axiom (1.4) hold. 
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2.3. Examples of modular models.
Example 7. Trivial modular models are obtained by setting F (∗, α, β, γ) =
0 for all valuations ∗ : Var→ 2 and for all ordinals α, β, γ < τ .
Example 8. Setting F = 1 yields modular models such that t∗ = ∗−1(0)
for every justification term t. These models are maximal.
Example 9. This example will illustrate that the inclusion in (2) can be
strict [7]. Define the functional F : 2Var × τ3 → 2 by
F (∗, α, β, γ) =
{
1, if tγ contains a +;
0, otherwise.
Let ∗ be a valuation and suppose that the formula P is false in the model
determined by F and ∗. Then 1 [x+ y] : P → x : P ∨ y : P .
This syntactical criterion ensures that for any false formula P , if the jus-
tification t has sufficient complexity, then t : P is true.
Example 10. Every modular model of DL arises through the choice of
a pair (F, v) consisting of a functional F and a valuation v : Var → 2.
Given a negative constant specification there is a choice of a functional F
that realizes it. For α large enough and for Pβ = e1 : · · · : en : P in the
specification, where e1 = tγ , set F (∗, α, β, γ) = 1. If Pβ = ¬e1 : · · · : en : P ,
then set F (∗, α, β, γ) = 0.
Example 11. Let DL◦ be denial logic without the Pairing axiom 1.3 and the
binary operation & on justification terms. The completeness theorem holds
for this logic. Also, the construction above goes through without mention
of the operation & or the Pairing axiom to yield an inductive construction
of models of DL◦. Let NCS = {a : A,¬A, b : B,¬B} and assume that
DL◦ +NCS is consistent. We may use the construction and the procedure
of the previous example to build a model of DL◦ +NCS such that for each
justification term t, t∗ ⊆ {A,B}. It follows that there is no justification term
s such that  s : A ∧B (otherwise A∧B ∈ s∗, contrary to the construction).
Hence there is no justification term s such that ⊢DL◦+NCS s : A ∧B. This
shows that the Evidence Pairing axiom is independent of the other axioms
of DL.
3. Philosophical Interpretation of DL
Artemov has characterized Justification Logic JL with an empty constant
specification as the “logic of general (not necessarily factive) justifications
for an absolutely skeptical agent for whom no formula is provably justified”
[6]. Denial Logic DL models an agent whose justified beliefs are false, who
cannot avow his own propositional attitudes, who is capable of believing log-
ical contradictions and for whom even tautologies of classical logic cannot
be justified. The soundness and completeness of DL and the number of its
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nontrivial modular models suggest that DL is suitable as a logic of philo-
sophical skepticism that goes beyond the skeptical challenges of Descartes’
Meditations and Putnam’s brains in vats [18, 33].
In his First Meditation, Descartes writes that he can still reason about
arithmetic and geometry even if he is dreaming: “For whether I am awake or
asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than
four sides. It seems impossible that such transparent truths should incur any
suspicion of being false” [18]. In our applications of DL below, our agents
will stop short of believing contradictions and disavowing their own beliefs.
In Reason, Truth and History, Hilary Putnam presented a modern for-
mulation of the skeptical challenge posed by the evil genius of Descartes’
Meditations [33]. Putnam’s argument that we could not be brains in a vat
provoked a vigorous philosophical response, e.g. [33, 29, 40, 22, 13, 16, 10,
14, 43, 42, 12, 21, 31, 36, 47, 32, 24, 11]. For Putnam, the thesis that we
are, have always been, and will always be brains in a vat is self-refuting on
semantic grounds. The argument remains controversial.
3.1. Brains in vats under DL. We interpret Putnam’s thought experi-
ment so that the logic of belief of our brain in a vat concerning its sensory
experience is denial logic DL. In this interpretation, the world consists of a
bio-computing facility supplying electrical impulses to a community of brains
in vats with nutrients and appropriate cabling to the computing facility. The
programming of the facility determines the sense experiences of the envat-
ted brains as its simulation runs [33]. We assume that logic of belief of an
envatted brain of its sense experience is given by a choice of language for
DL together with the choice of a negative constant specfication CS of the
justified false beliefs the brain holds about its experience.
More explicitly, we assume that for any sense experience the computing
facility induces within an envatted brain, there are one or more formulas
E of DL asserting something that the brain believes about that experience
(e.g., “I am not a brain in a vat”). Also, we assume that for every such
formula E that the envatted brain believes for some reason indicated by its
experience, there is a justified formula s : E of CS with justification term
s, such that in every model ∗ of DL + CS, the interpretation s∗ of s in
the model ∗ contains the formulas representing the account the brain would
provide of its experience, were the brain to attempt to justify its belief (e.g.,
“I am walking outside”, “the air is cool”, “I hear the cellphone ringing” and
so on).
Following Putnam’s thought experiment, we will assume that the sentence
“I am not a brain in a vat” is represented in DL + CS as s : E for some
justification term s. In DL + CS, ¬E holds; that is, the brain is indeed a
brain in a vat. In general we assume that DL + CS can formally represent
the epistemic state of an envatted brain as the computing facility determines
the brain’s sense experience, at least to to one order of belief. Beliefs about
beliefs will be addressed in the sequel.
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Our intention is that DL + CS formalizes the epistemic situation of the
envatted brain, as expressed by Ludwig in this passage [27, p.35–36].
[...] the brain in the vat is thinking ‘There’s a tree’ and means
what we do by that, and fails to be, in one sense, thinking
about a tree simply because his assumption that he is in
perceptual contact with a tree is false. The brain in the vat,
then, far from having mostly true beliefs in virtue of its not
being in causal contact with trees and tables and chairs and
the like, and so not thinking about such things, has mostly
false beliefs precisely because he fails, when talking about
things about him, to be thinking about trees and tables and
chairs and so on.
Given DL+CS, we use the knowledge extraction operator OK of Artemov
and Kuznets to derive a new logical system with an interpretation ∗ such
that if {s : E, ¬E} ⊆ CS (e.g., where s : E is “I am not a brain in a vat
for reason s”), then E will be true in ∗. If L is a justification logic and if
CS is a (negative) constant specification, we define the knowledge extraction
operator OK as follows [2].
OK(CS) := {E : ∃t ∈ Tm, ⊢L+CS t : E}.
A negative constant specification CS for DL is coherent if for every justifi-
cation term t such that ⊢DL+CS t : E, there exists a model ∗ of JL such that
 E. By JL we mean justification logic with the same language as DL+CS,
but without the specification.
Proposition 12. Suppose that CS is a coherent constant specification for
DL. Then every finite subcollection of OK(CS) is satisfiable in some mod-
ular model of JL.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then there is a finite sequence t1 : E1, . . . , tn :
En of justified formulas with Ei ∈ OK(CS) such that ⊢DL+CS ti : Ei for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and such that ((. . . (E1 ∧ E2) ∧ · · · ) ∧ En) is unsatisfiable in JL.
By logic,
⊢DL+CS ((. . . (t1 : E1 ∧ t2 : E2) ∧ · · · ) ∧ tn : En)
It follows from the Evidence Pairing axiom1.4 that there exists a justifi-
cation term t = [[. . . [t1 & t2] & · · · ] & tn] such that
⊢DL+CS t : ((. . . (E1 ∧ E2) ∧ · · · ) ∧En).
Since CS is coherent, there is a model ∗ of JL in which  ((. . . (E1 ∧ E2) ∧
· · · ) ∧ En). This is a contradiction. 
Theorem 13 (Blue Pill Theorem). JL + OK(CS) has a model ∗.
Proof. By Proposition 12 and the compactness of JL. Compactness follows
from the completeness theorem for JL [7]. 
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Under the assumption that the collection of justified beliefs of an envatted
brain is coherent, there exists a model ∗ in which “I am not a brain in a vat”
comes out true, as well as all of the other justified false assertions of the
negative constant specification CS.
The JL model ∗ was derived from Proposition 12 under the assumption
that DL+CS is consistent (which implies that it has a model) and that CS
is coherent. The mathematical argument makes no reference to Putnam’s
causal theory of reference [33]. It does not offer much assurance that we are
not brains in a vat, however.
Proposition 12 and Corollary 13 hold in more general justification logics
that satisfy an evidence pairing property. In general we have the following.
Corollary 14. Suppose that CS is a coherent constant specification for a
justification logic L. Suppose further that whenever ⊢L+CS r : A∧s : B there
exists a justification term t such that ⊢L+CS t : A ∧B. Then every finite
subcollection of OK(CS) is satisfiable in some modular model of JL with the
same language as L.
Corollary 15. JL +OK(CS) has a model ∗.
4. Multi-modal denial logic
Crispin Wright’s discussion of propositional attitudes in On Putnam’s
Proof that we are not Brains-in-a-vat suggests why DL is not suitable for
modeling beliefs about belief [48, p. 79].
It is part of the way we ordinarily think about self-consciousness
that we regard the contents of a subject’s contemporary propo-
sitional attitudes as something which, to use the standard
term of art, they can avow–something about which their judge-
ments are credited with a strong, though defeasible authority
which does not rest on reasons or evidence.
If knowledge is true justified belief, DL cannot model agents that know
anything. Nevertheless, DL is one starting point for logical models of skep-
tical thought experiments. To handle agents who can believe theorems of
classical logic and verify them, and who can avow their own propositional
attitudes, we can extend DL to DL ⊕JL LP, the algebraic fibring of Denial
Logic DL with the Logic of Proofs LP constrained by justification logic JL.
This is a pushout construction, first described in [39].1
JL → LP
↓ ↓
DL → DL⊕JL LP
1More generally, we suggest that the Humean distinction between “matters of fact” and
“relations of ideas” may be modeled by the algebraic fibring of two justification logics: one
appropriate for matters of fact and one appropriate to relations of ideas (e.g., analytic
propositions) [23].
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We indicate the construction in our case, which amounts to the fusion of
modal propositional Hilbert calculi.
Syntax and semantics of DL⊕JL LP. The syntax of DL⊕JL LP amends
that of DL as follows. Justification constants and variables are signed and
have the form cσi , x
σ
i where σ ∈ {+,−}. The signed justification constant c
+
i
(variable x+i ) is positive, and the signed justification constant c
−
i (variable
x−i ) is negative. A positive (negative) justification term of DL ⊕JL LP is an
expression of the form
tσ ::= cσi |x
σ
j | [t
σ + tσ] | [tσ · tσ] |
[
t− & t−
]
| !t+
where σ ∈ {+,−}, t+ is positive, and t− is negative. The set Tm of justifi-
cation terms is the disjoint union of the set Tm+ positive justification terms
and the set Tm− of negative justification terms.
The definition of a formula of DL⊕JLLP amends the definition of a formula
of denial logic DL as follows. A formula A of DL± is an expression of the
form
A ::= ⊥ |Ai | (A ∧A) | (A ∨A) | (A→ A) | t
+ : A | t− : A
where t+ is a positive justification term, t− is a negative justification term,
and where Ai is a propositional variable. The axioms of DL ⊕JL LP are
the same as DL and LP with the proviso that the Denial and Evidence
Pairing axioms are restricted to negatively justified formulas, factivity and
introspection are restricted to positively justified formulas, and the signs of
the terms appearing in the Sum and Application axioms must be the same.
Equivalently, the following axioms are those of DL⊕JL LP.
(4.1) Application. sσ : (P → Q)→ (tσ : P → [sσ · tσ] : Q)
(4.2) Sum. sσ : P → [sσ + tσ] : P, tσ : P → [sσ + tσ] : P i
(4.3) Denial. s− : P → ¬P
(4.4) Pairing. (s− : P ∧ t− : Q)→ [s− & t−] : (P ∧Q)
(4.5) Positive Factivity. t+ : P → P
(4.6) Positive Introspection. t+ : P → !t+ : t+ : P
where σ ∈ {+,−}, s− is negative, and t+ is positive. The rule of inference
in DL⊕JL LP is modus ponens.
Proposition 16. DL⊕JLLP ⊢ ¬ (s
− : P ∧ t+ : P ), where s− is negative, t+
is positive and where P is a formula.
Proof. Immediate from Axioms 4.3 and 4.5. 
Constant specifications for DL ⊕JL LP generalize those of JL and DL. A
constant specification for DL⊕JL LP is a collection C of formulas of the form
e1 : · · · : en : P and negations of such formulas, where the ei are justification
constants, such that (DL⊕JL LP) + C is consistent and where C is closed
under the following rules.
Rule 1. If t : P ∈ C and t is positive, then P ∈ C.
Rule 2. If s : P ∈ C and s is negative, then ¬P ∈ C.
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Rule 3. If ¬t : P ∈ C and t is positive, then ¬P ∈ C.
Rule 4. If ¬s : P ∈ C and s is negative, then P ∈ C.
This definition is motivated as follows. A set C consisting of formulas only
of the form e1 : · · · : en : P with all ei positive is just a constant specification
in the usual sense. Rule 1 is forced by the Positive Factivity axiom (4.5), and
Rule 3 is consistent with with it. Dually, Rule 2 is forced by signed denial,
and Rule 4 is consistent with it.
A modular model of DL ⊕JL LP is a pair of maps, both denoted by ∗, of
types Var → 2 and Tm− ∪ Tm+ = Tm → 2Fm that satisfy the following
conditions.
(sσ)∗ · (tσ)∗ ⊆ [sσ · tσ]∗(5)
(sσ)∗ ∪ (tσ)∗ ⊆ [sσ + tσ]∗(6) (
s−
)∗
&
(
t−
)∗
⊆
[
s− & t−
]∗
(7) (
t−
)∗
⊆
(
∗|Tm−
)−1
(0)(8) (
t+
)∗
⊆
(
∗|Tm+
)−1
(1)(9)
P ∈
(
t+
)∗
→ t+ : P ∈
(
!t+
)∗
(10)
where sσ, tσ ∈ Tmσ, σ ∈ {+,−}.
If CS is a constant specification for DL ⊕JL LP, then a model ∗ respects
CS if all formulas of the CS hold in ∗ [6, 7]. The analog of Theorem 5, the
soundness and completeness theorem, holds for DL⊕JL LP.
Theorem 17. DL⊕JL LP is complete.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ is a formula of DL⊕JL LP such that
0DL⊕JLLP ϕ.(11)
Let L be a justification logic, and let Fm(L) denote the set of formulas of
L. Let V be a set of new propositional variables Xs−:ψ for each negatively
justified formula s− : ψ of DL ⊕JL LP. Let L
′ denote the justification logic
obtained from the LP fragment of DL⊕JL LP by adjoining the set V of new
variables and closing under Boolean connectivies and positive justification
terms. If s : ψ ∈ Fm(L′), then s is a positive justification term.
Define by induction a transformation T : Fm(DL ⊕JL LP) → Fm(L
′) as
follows.
T (E) = E if E is a propositional variable;
T (¬E) = ¬T (E);
T (D ◦ E) = T (D) ◦ T (E) if ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→};
T (s+ : E) = s+ : T (E) for s+ positive;
T (s− : E) = Xs−:T (E) for s
− negative.
The logic L′ together with the T -images of the axioms of DL⊕JLLP and with
Modus Ponens as the rule of inference is a justification logic satisfying the
axioms of the Logic of Proofs. This is because the T -images of classical logic
axioms in DL⊕JLLP are precisely the substitution instances of those axioms
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in Fm(L′); and similarly the T -images of the application, factivity, sum and
proof checker axioms of the LP fragment of DL ⊕JL LP are precisely the
substitution instances of those axioms in Fm(L′). Hence for ψ ∈ Fm(DL⊕JL
LP), ⊢DL⊕JLLP ψ ⇔⊢L′ T (ψ). It follows from (11) that 0 T (ϕ). By the
completeness theorem for LoP , there is a modular model ∗′ of L′ such that
∗′ 2 T (ϕ) [26].
Define a model ∗ of DL⊕JL LP from ∗
′ as follows. If ψ is a propositional
variable of DL⊕JL LP, take ∗ψ = ∗
′ψ. If t+ is a positive justification term,
take (t+)
∗
= (t+)
∗′
. If s− is a negative justification term, define (s−)
∗
to be
the set such that for each ψ ∈ Fm(DL⊕JL LP),
ψ ∈ (s−)
∗
⇔ ∗′  Es−:T (ψ).
By induction, if ψ is a formula of DL⊕JL LP, then
∗  ψ ⇔ ∗′  T (ψ).(12)
For example, ∗  t− : ψ ⇔ ψ ∈ (s−)
∗
⇔ ∗′  T (t− : ψ).
Moreover, ∗ satisfies conditions (5) through (9) of subsection 5. For ex-
ample, the T -image of the Denial axiom ensures that ∗ satisfies condition
(4) above. If ∗  s− : ψ holds, then so does ∗′  Es−:T (ψ). Since the T -image
of the Denial axiom holds, ∗′  Es−:T (ψ) → ¬T (ψ), and hence ∗
′
 ¬T (ψ)
holds. But by (12), ∗  ¬ψ, which yields (4). The other cases are similar.
Hence ∗ is a model of DL⊕JL LP in which ∗ 2 ϕ. 
4.1. Internalization in DL⊕JLLP. A constant specification CS for a justi-
fication logic JL is axiomatically appropriate if for each axiom A of JL, there
is a justification constant e1 such that e1 : A is in CS, and if CS is down-
ward closed (cf. subsection 1.1) [6]. The Logic of Proofs LP can internalize
its deductions. More generally, we have the following.
Theorem 18 (Theorem 1, [6]). For each axiomatically appropriate constant
specification CS, JL + CS enjoys the Internalization Property:
If ⊢ F , then ⊢ p : F for some justification term p.
Recall that DL with a nontrivial constant specification is inconsistent.
A fortiori, DL with an axiomatically appropriate constant specification is
inconsistent. This fact motivated our definition of negative constant specifi-
cations for DL and our generalization of negative constant specifications to
DL⊕JLLP. Accordingly, the definition of axiomatically appropriate constant
specifications in DL⊕JL LP must be restricted to constant specifications CS
with positive justification constants applied to the axioms of DL ⊕JL LP.
With this restriction, DL⊕JL LP+CS satisfies the internalization property.
We also note that in justification logics with axiomatically appropriate
constant specifications, the Evidence Pairing axiom is unnecessary. In such
a system, there is a justification constant a such that
(13) a : (P → (Q→ (P ∧Q)))
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holds. If s : P holds, then by the Application axiom and modus ponens
we have [a · s] : (B → (P ∧Q)). And if t : Q holds, application and modus
ponens gives us [[a · s] · t] : (P ∧Q). However, (13) is inconsistent with DL.
5. Anthropogenic Global Warming Denial in DL⊕JL LP
Earth scientists often speak of the indicators produced by their biogeo-
physical models [45, 46, 35]. The scientific modeling, remote sensing and
economic literature is replete with this usage: ecologists speak of indica-
tors of ecosystem stress; meteorologists speak of atmospheric indicators of
climate change, economists speak of economic indicators and so on [28, 34,
44]. The scientific vocabulary of indicators of biogeophysical models suggests
reading t : E in JL as “t indicates E.” This reading is more natural for our
applications than “term t is justification for E.”
The logic DL⊕JLLP can model an agent who believes that climate models
are as “close to falsification [...] as mathematically possible,” but who allows
that CO2 is a greenhouse gas [15]. For this agent, this the only scientific
statement pertaining to global warming that can be justified. We think of
the DL fragment of DL ⊕JL LP as the logic of indicators of some climate
model. The first assertion is expressed by the Denial axiom, which holds in
the DL fragment of DL⊕JL LP. For example, if E is some statement about
the environment, such as “global warming is accelerating,” then t : E is the
statement that t is indication of some climate model that E. The second
statement is positively justified in the LP fragment of DL ⊕JL LP as s : C,
where s is a positive justification term.
Proposition 19. In DL⊕JL LP, if s : C with s positive, and if t : E with t
negative, then there is no positive justification term j such that j : (C → E).
Proof. Suppose there exists such a j. The Positive Application axiom asserts
that for j, s positive justification terms, [j · s] is also positive, and
j : (C → E)→ (s : C → [j · s] : E) .(14)
By MP twice, [j · s] : E. This together with the assumption t : E contradicts
Proposition 16. 
The agent asserts that the only thing scientists can justify is that CO2 is
a greenhouse gas. This is modeled by adjoining to DL⊕JL LP the formulas
c : C and C, where c is a positive justification constant. In effect, the
agent accepts c : C and C as axioms. However, “climate models are as
close to falsification [...] as is mathematically possible,” which in DL⊕JL LP
is represented as the Denial axiom in the DL fragment. In this context,
in which the DL fragment of DL ⊕JL LP models the logic of indicators of
some climate model, the Denial axiom asserts that every indicator produced
by that climate model is wrong. This is enough to rule out any scientific
conclusion that might follow from the concession that CO2 is a greenhouse
gas.
16 F. LENGYEL AND BEN ST-PIERRE
One can say more about the epistemic state of the agent in a larger system,
DL ⊕JL JL ⊕JL LP, in which the middle summand can represent justified
beliefs that may be true or false. In this case the agent believes that the
denial axiom holds for climate models. This is modeled in DL ⊕JL ⊕JLLP
by adjoining e : (s− : E → ¬E) where e is a “neutral” justification constant
from the middle JL summand.
Also, the agent believes that he knows that the Denial axiom holds for
climate models. This is expressed by the formula e : t+ : (s− : E → ¬E),
where t+ is a positive justification constant.
6. Envatted brains under DL⊕JL LP
We augment the situation and logical apparatus of subsection 3.1 by stip-
ulating that the logic of justified belief of the computer generated sensory
experiences of the envatted brains is definable within the DL fragment of the
logic DL ⊕JL LP. Further, this logic can model brains that have positively
justified beliefs about their negatively justified beliefs about their sense ex-
perience. An envatted brain may correctly believe that it believes that its
sensory experience indicates that it is an embodied human (and not a brain
confined to a vat). In DL ⊕JL LP this epistemic state is expressed as a
formula of the form t+ : s− : E, in which t+ represents the positively justi-
fied belief that the negatively justified belief represented by s− indicates E.
From t+ : s− : E Positive Factivity yields s− : E, and from this Denial yields
¬E. We do not stipulate that the Denial axiom is positively justified. The
analogs of Proposition 12 and the Blue Pill Theorem 13 hold in DL⊕JL LP.
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